

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

/026 W

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P 241250 Z APR 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8540

INFO SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

USDEL SALT TWO II PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 3342

EXDIS

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FROM US MBFR REP

E. O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET REP APRIL 20.

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. ON APRIL 20, US REP HAD DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET REP KVITSINSKIY AT LATTER' S REQUEST. KVITSINSKIY SAID HE HAD BEEN UNEXPECTEDLY CALLED BACK TO MOSCOW, PROBABLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE BREZHNEV VISIT TO BONN. HE HAD HEARD THAT NATO HAD NOT YET DECIDED ON THE SOVIET PROPOSAL CONCERNING HUNGARY. HE EXPRESSED READINESS TO DISCUSS THE AGENDA AND COMMUNIQUE AS SOON AS THE HUNGARIAN ISSUE WAS RESOLVED, BUT SAID THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY AGREE ON DATE FOR MBFR NEGOTIATIONS ONLY WHEN A FIRM DATE FOR THE FIRST PHASE OF CSCE HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. END SUMMARY.

2. AT THE OUTSET OF THE DISCUSSION ON APRIL 20, KVITSINSKIY SAID HE HAD ASKED FOR THE MEETING TO INFORM US REP HE HAD JUST RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO RETURN TO MOSCOW. KVITSINSKIY THOUGHT THE PROBABLE REASON FOR THE INSTRUCTION, WHICH HE EXPECTED

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KHLESTOV TO RESIST IN VAIN, WAS THAT BONDARENKO, HEAD OF THE CENTRAL EUROPE SECTION OF THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WANTED HIS ASSISTANCE IN CONNECTION WITH THE PENDING BREZHNEV TRIP TO BONN. KVITSINSKIY SAID BONDARENKO WAS NOT FULLY CONVERSANT WITH THE DETAILS OF THE SOVIET- GERMAN AND BERLIN AGREEMENTS WHICH THE SOVIETS EXPECTED THE FRG TO RAISE DURING THE VISIT AND MIGHT NEED KVITSINSKIY' S HELP FOR BRIEFING BREZHNEV, OR BONARENKO MIGH HIMSELF BE PLANNING TO ACCOMPANY BREZHNEV AND WISH TO LEAVE KVITSINSKIY IN CHARGE OF THE SECTION DURING HIS VISIT. KVITSINSKIY SAID IT WAS IMPROBABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HE WOULD RETURN TO VIENNA UNLESS SOME SPECIAL REASON FOR DOING SO DEVELOPED.

3. KVITSINSKIY ASKED ABOUT THE STATUS OF ALLIED DELIBERATIONS ON THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR THE TREATMENT OF THE HUNGARIAN ISSUE. US REP SAID HE AND NETHERLANDS REP HAD REPEATEDLY WARNED KVITSINSKIY THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE TOUGH GOING AND THAT THERE WAS NO DECISION. KVITSINSKIY REPLIED HE HAD ALREADY HEARD " FROM THE ROMANIANS" THAT NAC HAD NOT REACHED A DECISION IN ITS MEETING ON APRIL 18. US REP SAID THAT THE OUTCOME WAS UNCERTAIN, BUT, IN THE EVENT OF A FAVORABLE DECISION, SOME IMPORTANT DETAILS WOULD REMAIN TO BE DISCUSSED INCLUDING THE STATUS OF THE EXCHANGE OF STATEMENTS, PUBLICITY TO BE GIVEN THESE STATEMENTS, AND THE CARRY OVER OF AGREED PROCEDURES TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. KVITSINSKIY REPLIED THAT PUBLICITY WAS THE ALLIES' OWN AFFAIR. HE SAW NO REASON TO ATTEMPT TO REACH ANY SPECIFIC EAST- WEST UNDERSTANDING ON THIS SUBJECT. WITH REGARD TO THE STATUS OF STATEMENTS, THE SOVIETS STOOD BY THEIR PROPOSAL THAT STATEMENTS COULD BE INCLUDED IN THE PROTOCOL OF THE FIRST PLENARY SESSION, BUT WOULD NOT GO FURTHER. THE US REP STRESSED THAT WHATEVER THE OUTCOME OF POSSIBLE FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THIS TOPIC, THE STATEMENTS MUST HAVE THE SAME STATUS AS THE PROCEDURES PAPER AND BE IN WRITTEN FORM.

4. US REP SAID IT MUST BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT THE PROCEDURES PAPER WOULD BE CARRIED OVER TO THE NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT THE SOVIETS ASKING OR RECEIVING ANYTHING FURTHER FROM THE ALLIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOVIET DESIRE TO INVITE NEUTRALS OR NON-ALIGNED AS OBSERVERS. KVITSINSKIY COMPLAINED US REP WAS PRESSING TOO HARD, AND THAT SOVIETS WOULD AT LEAST WANT TO RESERVE THE RIGHT TO RAISE DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS THE QUESTION
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OF PARTICIPATION BY OTHERS AS OBSERVERS.

5. TURNING TO AGENDA, KVITSINSKIY SAID THAT FRG REP HOFFMAN HAD ALREADY PROPOSED TO HIM THE FRG FORMULA FOR

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 VIENNA 3342

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AN AGENDA LIMITED TO " FORCE LEVELS, ACTIVITIES AND REDUCTIONS," AND HAD ASKED FOR SOVIET REACTION. KVITSINSKIY SAID THE SOVIETS DID NOT LIKE THE TERM " ACTIVITIES" SINCE IT SMACKED OF THE FAMILIAR " MEASURES" AND " CONSTRAINTS" ON WHICH THE SOVIETS HAD A NEGATIVE VIEW. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE AGENDA COULD BE LIMITED TO A CENTRAL ITEM OF REDUCTIONS OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND CONTAIN PERHAPS ONE OR TWO SUBORDINATE ITEMS SUCH AS AREA, PLUS A REFERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. THIS SHOULD BE ENOUGH KVITSINSKIY SAID SOVIETS WOULD BE AGREEABLE EITHER TO INTRODUCING THE AGENDA SUBJECT IN PLENARIES OR THROUGH THE MULTIPLE BILATERAL METHOD AND TO CONTINUING DISCUSSION ON AN INFORMAL BASIS.

6. REGARDING A COMMUNIQUE AND SETTING A SPECIFIC DATE FOR THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, KVITSINSKIY STATED EXPLICITLY THAT HE THOUGHT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE WILLING TO AGREE TO A SPECIFIC DATE FOR MBFR NEGOTIATIONS ONLY WHEN A SPECIFIC DATE FOR THE FIRST PHASE OF CSCE HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE HELSINKI TALKS. US REP SAID THAT SOVIET REP ZORIN HAD MADE MORE DIFFICULT REACHING AGREEMENT ON A DATE AT

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HELSINKI THROUGH HIS STATEMENTS ON THE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT ISSUE JUST PRIOR TO THE LAST HELSINKI RECESS. KVITSINSKIY CLAIMED INDIVIDUAL STATEMENTS OF THIS KIND WERE NOT DETERMINING AND WERE NOT THE ISSUE. ONE SHOULD KEEP ONE'S EYE ON THE BIG PICTURE OF OVERALL AGREEMENT ON A TIME FRAME FOR BOTH CSCE AND MBFR. HE WAS NOT AN EXPERT ON CSCE, BUT THE WEST MUST BE REALISTIC ABOUT THE SUBJECT OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT. THE SOVIETS WERE NOT GOING TO GO FAR ON THIS SUBJECT BECAUSE TO DO SO WOULD UNDERMINE THEIR SYSTEM TO AN EXTENT THEY COULD NOT AFFORD. THE SOVIET SYSTEM WAS NOT GOING TO COMMIT SUICIDE FOR THE SAKE OF CSCE. IF THE SOVIETS WERE CHIVVIED INTO AGREEING TO TOO MUCH ON PAPER, ONE COULD BE SURE IT WOULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED. THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP DID NOT LIKE UNDERTAKING OBLIGATIONS UNLESS IT WAS IN A POSITION TO MAINTAIN THEM. SOMETHING WOULD BE DONE IN THIS FIELD, BUT NOT A GREAT DEAL.

7. KVITSINSKIY SAID HIS OWN VIEW OF CSCE WAS " HERETICAL." HE THOUGHT MBFR WAS CONSIDERABLY MORE IMPORTANT FOR THE SOVIETS AND HAD DEFENDED THIS VIEW IN MOSCOW. THE TROOP REDUCTION PROJECT INVOLVED REAL THINGS AND REAL SOVIET INTERESTS. CSCE WAS A MATTER OF GENERAL DECLARATIONS. MOREOVER, ORIGINAL SOVIET INTEREST IN THE CSCE HAD DIMINISHED BECAUSE OF THE COURSE OF EVENTS. IN THE TIME SINCE THE SOVIETS HAD ORIGINALLY PROPOSED CSCE, THE GERMAN-SOVIET AND GERMAN-POLISH AGREEMENTS HAD BEEN SIGNED AND RATIFIED. THE FRG-GDR AGREEMENT WAS ON THE VERGE OF RATIFICATION. THESE AGREEMENTS GAVE THE SOVIETS THE ESSENTIAL POINTS THEY HAD BEEN SEEKING IN THEIR EARLIER PROJECT OF THE CSCE AND IN A MORE DIRECT WAY. HENCE, IN HIS VIEW, THE CSCE WAS NO LONGER AS IMPORTANT FOR SOVIET INTERESTS.

8. ON A PERSONAL NOTE, KVITSINSKIY SAID THAT HE HAD HAD AN ATTACK OF HIGH BLOOD PRESSURE FOLLOWING THE LAST ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS ON THE HUNGARIAN ISSUE. HE CLAIMED ALLIED TACTICS WERE THE REASON.

9. US REP WILL BRIEF AD HOC GROUP ON ABOVE CONVERSATION. ADDRESSEES REQUESTED TO MAINTAIN NOFORN LIMITATION UNTIL THIS HAD BEEN DONE. HUMES

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